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VOLUME 37 SPRING 2005 NUMBER 3
The Transformation of Modem
Corporation Law:
The Law of Corporate Groups
PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG*
The response of the law to the challenge presented by the emergence of
multinational corporations and other corporate groups as the dominant in-
stitutions in the world's economy is a major development in American and
world jurisprudence. As commerce and industry have become transformed
in the centuries since the beginnings of the Industrial Revolution, the cor-
poration laws of the countries of the western world have become anachro-
nistic. The traditional corporation law presupposing as its subject the indi-
vidual corporation and looking upon it as the basic legal unit entity no
longer adequately serves all the needs of modern jurisprudence.
To deal with this institutional weakness, the traditional law in a grow-
ing number of areas is being supplemented by a doctrine of enterprise law
that focuses on the business enterprise as a whole, not on its fragmented
components.' In selected areas, this newer perspective of the law better
Dean Blumberg is Dean and Professor of Law and Business, Emeritus, at The University of
Connecticut School of Law. He was educated at Harvard College (A.B. magna cum laude) and Har-
vard Law School (J.D. magna cum laude) where he was Treasurer of the Harvard Law Review. He has
received the LL.D. (Hon.) degree from The University of Connecticut. He is the author of many books
and articles on corporate groups.
I For reviews of this development, see JOSE E. ANTUNES, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE GROUPS
(1994); PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, KURT A. STRASSER, NICHOLAS L. GEORGAKOPOULOS, & ERIC J. GOU-
vN, BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS (2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE
GROUPS]; PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS IN THE
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serves a society in which business is overwhelmingly conducted by corpo-
rate groups. These are enterprises organized in the form of a dominant
parent corporation with scores or hundreds of subservient sub-holding,
subsidiary, and affiliated companies. These typically conduct a single in-
tegrated enterprise under common control and often under a common pub-
lic persona. While the older entity view still adequately serves many areas,
that view no longer prevails as a transcendental concept dominating all
corporation law.
A full understanding of the law of corporate groups must proceed on
three levels. As a matter of legal history, how did corporation law arise
and to what extent does its history help to explain its evolution? As a mat-
ter of legal analysis, of what does it consist and what is its role in contem-
porary law? As a matter ofjurisprudence, what does it represent?
The issue may be simply stated. In the modem economy, as noted,
business of large or moderate size is typically conducted not by a single
corporation but by a group of affiliated companies under the "control" of a
parent corporation that operates, as the Supreme Court has noted, "with a
unity of purpose" and a "common design."2 When legal issues involving
any of the affiliated corporations arise, courts are often called upon to de-
termine whether to attribute the rights or impose the duties of one affiliated
corporation upon another affiliate of the group in order to implement the
objectives of the law in the area in dispute. Over the past century, courts
and legislatures have been increasingly faced in numerous areas by this
choice between focusing on the individual corporate entity or the enterprise
in resolving the legal questions before them.
This choice between entity and enterprise did not face the law when
corporate existence involved only the corporation on the one hand and its
shareholders on the other. From its very beginning in medieval days, cor-
poration law deemed each corporation by virtue of its creation through a
royal or state charter as an independent juridical entity with its own rights
and duties, separate and distinct from those of its shareholders.3 For centu-
LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS (1983) (this work is the first in a seven volume
treatise, the last volume of which was published in 1998); PHILLIP 1. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL
CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW (1993) [hereinafter MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE]; KONZERN-
RECHT IM AUSLAND (Marcus Lutter ed., 1994); PETER MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
AND THE LAW (1999); I GRUPPI DI SOCIETA (Paola Balzarini et al. eds., 1995).
2 Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771-72 (1984).
3See I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 467-74, 478, re-
printed in CLASSICS OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY IN THE MODERN ERA (David S. Berkowitz & Samuel
E. Thorne eds., 9th ed. 1978); COLIN A. COOKE, CORPORATION TRUST AND COMPANY 7-18 (1951); 3
WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 469-90 (3d ed. 1927); 2 STEWART KYD, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 103, reprinted in CLASSICS OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY IN
THE MODERN ERA (David S. Berkowitz & Samuel E. Thorne eds., 9th ed. 1978); FREDERIC W. MAIT-
LAND, MAITLAND SELECTED ESSAYS (Hazeltine et al. eds., 1936); Cecil T. Carr, Early Forms of Cor-
porateness, in 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 161-82 (1909); William S.
Holdsworth, English Corporation Law in the 16th and 17th Centuries, 31 YALE L.J. 382, 382 (1922);
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ries, this separation of corporation from shareholder rested solely on this
doctrine of corporate personality.
With the Industrial Revolution and the increasing need for more corpo-
rate capital to exploit the burgeoning technological developments of the
time, this jurisprudential concept of the separate corporate personality was
strongly reinforced by the political decision in the early nineteenth century
of legislatures to provide limited liability for shareholders.4 By then, with
the growth of corporate size and the substantially increased number of
shareholders, shareholders were increasingly investors, not participants in
management. Major economic policy supported by powerful political
pressures joined pure legal theory to insulate corporate shareholder-
investors from the financial obligations of the corporation. While entity
law since then has rested on the policy of limited liability as well as the
jurisprudential theory of corporate personality where financial obligations
are in issue, it still rests on jurisprudential theory alone for all other mat-
ters.
A half century later, the very nature of the business organization ex-
perienced a revolutionary change. Until this time, corporations had not
been generally authorized to own shares of other corporations. Holding
companies and subsidiaries were unknown.5 Then in 1890, New Jersey
enacted pathbreaking legislation that earned it the appellation of "New
Jersey-The Traitor State."6 Opening a new chapter in American corpo-
rate history,7 corporations for the first time were generally authorized to
acquire shares of other companies. With the door thus opened to holding
companies, parent, and subsidiary corporations, the major businesses of the
time, led by Standard Oil and United States Steel took advantage of the
new law and reorganized as corporate groups.'
The new corporate permissiveness worked a profound transformation
of the economic structure of the country. It led to tremendous growth in
Samuel Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, 2 HARV. L. REV. 105,
108-09 (1888).
4 See E. MERRICK DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860, at 1-9 (1954).
5 Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 556 n.32 (1933) (Brandeis, J.); see also BLUMBERG
ON CORPORATE GROUPS, supra note 1, § 3.04 (discussing the evolution of the business organization in
nineteenth-century America).
6 Act of Apr. 4, 1888, ch. 269, § 1, 1888 N.J. Laws 385-86; Act of Apr. 17, 1888, ch. 295, § 1,
1888 N.J. Laws 445-46; Act of May 9, 1889, ch. 265, § 4, 1889 N.J. Laws 412-14; Act of Mar. 14,
1893, ch. 171, § 2, 1893 N.J. Laws 301; see Lincoln Steffens, New Jersey: A Traitor State, Part !!-
How She Sold Out the United States, 25 MCCLURE'S MAG. 41 (1905). See generally BLUMBERG ON
CORPORATE GROUPS, supra note 1, § 6.02; PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS:
TORT, CONTRACT, AND OTHER COMMON LAW PROBLEMS IN THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF PARENT AND
SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS § 3.02.1 (1987).
7ALFRED D. CHANDLER, STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF THE IN-
DUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 30 (1962) (turning point in the evolution of American business).
8 See, e.g., Edward Q. Keasbey, New Jersey and the Great Corporations (pt. 1), Address Before
the American Bar Association at Buffalo (Aug. 28, 1899), in 13 HARV. L. REV. 198 (1899-1900).
20051
CONNECTICUT LA WREVIEW
the size, scope, and complexity of American enterprise, to continuing
mergers and acquisitions, and to a grave increase in industrial concentra-
tion. Today, corporate groups of enormous size with complex multi-tiered
corporate structures dominate the national and world economy.9
With this dramatic change in the economic realities of business, the
corporate law of older times formulated for the far simpler economy when
corporate groups were unknown became largely anachronistic and dysfunc-
tional. Thus, in response to the serious inadequacies in American corpo-
rate law, a greatly increased reliance on enterprise principles has devel-
oped. In numerous areas, American courts and legislatures have turned to
concepts of enterprise and have attributed the rights or liabilities of one
interrelated affiliate of a corporate group to another affiliate in resolving
legal questions.
Thus, in statutory law, entity law had proven a well-nigh insuperable
barrier to effective federal regulation of the railroads, the pioneer area in
American government regulation of industry." Prompted by this disas-
trous history, the Franklin Roosevelt administration in its first great wave
of major reform statutes commencing in 1933 abandoned "entity" as the
legal standard. In one of the outstanding developments in American juris-
prudence, the draftsmen of the "New Deal" statutes and administrative
regulations turned away from traditional corporate theory and adopted en-
terprise concepts and the functional standard of "control." In major legisla-
tion including the Emergency Transportation Act," the Securities Acts of
9 World Investment Report 2002, U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, at 87, 90, U.N.
Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2002, U.N. Sales No. E.02.II.D.4 (2002), available at http://www.unctad.
org/en/docs/wir2002_en.pdf.; U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2003,
Section 15: Business Enterprise, Table Nos. 742, 748-50 (2003), available at http://www.census.
gov/prod/2004pubs/03statab/business.pdf.
10 The Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
49 U.S.C.), as amended by The Hepburn Act, 34 Stat. 584 (1906) (superceded sub silentio) is one
example of the failure of a federal statute to defeat the protection afforded American industry by entity
law. The Hepburn Act's "Commodities Clause" made it unlawful for a railroad company to transport
in interstate commerce (except for its own use) virtually any article or commodity manufactured,
mined, or produced by the railroad company or under its authority, or any material in which the railroad
company owned an interest. See United States v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 415-18 (1909)
(upholding the constitutionality of the Interstate Commerce Act as a valid congressional regulation of
commerce). The ineffectiveness of the Commodities Clause, however, was quickly demonstrated by
railroad companies that transported materials produced by parent and sister corporations. See United
States v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co., 298 U.S. 492, 497-98, 501 (1936) (concluding that a holding com-
pany's ownership of all stock of a railroad subsidiary did not, under the Commodities Clause, preclude
the railroad company from transporting materials produced by the holding company); United States v.
S. Buffalo Ry. Co., 333 U.S. 771, 772, 782-83, 785 (1948) (declining to overrule Elgin on similar
facts); see also PHILLIP 1. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROBLEMS OF PARENT AND
SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS UNDER STATUTORY LAW OF GENERAL APPLICATION §19.02 (1989)
(discussing statutorily-established officer and director liability under the Transportation Act of 1920).
11 48 Stat. 217 (1933) (codified in various sections of 49 U.S.C.).
[Vol. 37:605
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1933 and 1934,12 the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 3 the National
Labor Relations Act,14 and the Investment Company Act of 1940,"5 "con-
trol" became firmly established as the model for assuring expansive statu-
tory scope in American regulatory law. Numerous subsequent federal and
state statutes have similarly focused on "control," particularly in legislation
and regulations regulating banking, insurance, and financial services. 6
In these statutes (and the regulations 7 thereunder), the law turned
firmly to "control" as the foundation of regulatory programs dealing with
the key industries of the economy. Influenced by the success of American
statutory regulation of industry based on the encompassing standard of
"control," the same standard has been utilized by governments throughout
the world.'8 It is a major development in the evolution of the modem ad-
ministrative state.
Enterprise law rests on the realities of the complex business enterprise
in which business activities are collectively conducted by interrelated and
intertwined juridical entities under the "control" of a dominant parent cor-
poration. Of all the features that characterize enterprise law and corporate
groups, "control" is predominant in judge-made as well as statutory law.
Thus, in numerous areas of procedure including res judicata and collateral
12 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2000)); 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78a (2000)).
13 49 Stat. 803 (1935) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 79a (2000)).
14 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000)).
15 54 Stat. 789 (1940) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (2000)).
16 See, e.g., Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1841 (2000)); Savings & Loan Holding Company Amendments Act, 82 Stat. 5 (1968) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1467a (2000)); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified in
various sections of 12, 15, 16, & 18 U.S.C.); Nevada Gaming Control Act, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
463 (Michie 2001); N.J. Alcoholic Beverage Law, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33:1-1 (West 1994); MODEL INS.
HOLDING COMPANY SYS. REGULATORY ACT § 1 (2004).
17 Thus, although "control" is not mentioned in the National Labor Relations Act, the Labor
Board developed the "integrated enterprise" standard encompassing the concept of "control" that re-
ceived Supreme Court approval. 21 NLRB ANN. REP. 14 (1956); Radio & Television Broad. Techni-
cians Local Union v. Broad. Serv. of Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255, 256 (1965) (per curiam). In its stat-
utes amending the anti-discrimination statutes to give them extraterritorial application over American
workers of American corporations and subsidiaries working abroad, the Congress subsequently adopted
the "integrated enterprise" standard in haec verba. Older American Act Amendments of 1984, 98 Stat.
1767, 1792 (1984) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 623(h) (2000)); Civil Rights Act of 1991, 105
Stat. 1071, 1077 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2000)).
18 For foreign examples of the use of "control" or its cognate, "dominant influence," as the linch-
pin of statutory scope, see Aktiengesetz (Stock Corporation Act), of Sept. 6, 1965 (BGB I. 1 § 291);
Companies Act, 1989, c. 40, § 21(1) (Eng.); Council Regulation 2157/2001 on the Statute for a Euro-
pean Company, art. 6, 2001 O.J. (L 294) 4; Council Directive 2001/86/EC, art. 2(c), 2001 O.J. (L 294)
22; Council Directive 94/45/EC, art. 2(b), 3, 1994 O.J. (L 254) 64; Council Directive 83/349/EC, art. 1,
§ l(c), 1983 O.J. (L 193) 1-2; Council Directive 83/349/EC, art. 1, § 1(c), 1983 O.J. (L 193) 1-2;
Corporations Act, 2001 §§ 46(a)(i), 588V (1)(d)(ii) (Austl.); Business Corporations Act, R.S.C., ch. C-
44, § 2(3) (1985) (Can.); Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, S.C., ch. 27 (1992) (Can.); see also BLUM-
BERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS, supra note 1, § 182.03.
2005]
CONNECTICUT LA W REVIEW
estoppel, discovery, and cross-voting, courts have almost universally
adopted enterprise law based on "control" alone. 9 Similarly, the "exces-
sive" exercise of "control" depriving a subsidiary or other subservient party
of any significant decisionmaking power suffices for the application of
enterprise law in those jurisdictions accepting the "single-factor" form of
"piercing" jurisprudence reviewed below. 20
In most jurisdictions, however, judicial application of enterprise prin-
ciples requires a showing not only of "excessive" use of "control" but also
of the close economic intertwining of the activities of the related corpora-
tions. This second factor-collective conduct of an economically inte-
grated business-is the other major element supporting reliance on enter-
prise law.2'
Above and beyond "control" and economic integration, there are four
additional factors of significance 22 that help support the application of en-
terprise principles: (a) a common public persona featuring a common trade
name, logo, and marketing plan; (b) financial interdependence in which the
parent or the group participate in financing of the subsidiaries, who do not
raise their own capital independently; (c) administrative interdependence in
which the subsidiary operates without its own legal, auditing, tax, public
relations, safety, engineering, or research and development departments
and relies on its parent personnel for such purposes; and (d) group identifi-
cation of employees with group-wide, rather than company-by-company
stock option, retirement, medical insurance, and related benefit plans, and
group personnel assignments as executives move through various compa-
nies of the group during their careers.
While the literature about "piercing the veil," particularly the literature
reviewing the economic dimensions of the doctrine of limited liability,
tends to concentrate on the choice between traditional entity or enterprise
concepts in contract and tort,23 the fact of the matter is that much, if not
19 See BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS, supra note 1, §§ 182.03 (general), 37.01 (discovery),
39.01 (res judicata and collateral discovery), 44.01 (multiple derivative actions), 47.01 (cross voting).
20 See id. § 12.02[D].
21 For example, economic integration is the factor that along with "control" appears and reappears
in judicial doctrines employing enterprise principles, along with "stream of commerce," "market ex-
ploitation," "integrated enterprise, "single business enterprise," "functional delegation," and "quasi-
agency." See id. §§ 12.04, 16.02, 17.02, 28.04, 29.03, 29.06, 30.01.
2 See id. § 182.04.
23 See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 14.4 (3d ed. 1986); Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischl, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89 (1985)
(discussing creditors' ability to pierce the corporate veil to satisfy their claims); Paul Halpern et al., An
Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation Law, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 117 (1980) (discuss-
ing tort and bankruptcy creditors' ability to pierce the corporate veil to satisfy their claims); cf. Phillip
I. Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, II J. CORP. L. 573 (1986) (analyzing limited
liability as applied to corporate groups rather than to smaller controlled corporations and their individ-
ual controlling shareholders).
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most, of the law of corporate groups is found in other areas.
It particularly flourishes in these areas where financial liability is not
involved in the issue at hand. In these areas including procedure and in
personam jurisdiction, entity law rests solely on the traditional jurispruden-
tial concept of the separate juridical personality of the corporation. Here,
the policy concerns underlying the doctrine of limited liability are entirely
absent. No wonder that in these areas, traditional legal theory often lacks
the power to withstand the pressures arising from the economic and politi-
cal realities of the enterprise before the court.
Where, however, financial liability is concerned, entity law rests not
only on jurisprudential conceptions of the corporate personality. It also
rests on the doctrine of limited liability, an expression of legislative policy
widely recognized as one of the fundamental building blocks of the modern
economy. In matters where substantive liability is at stake-whether im-
posed by contract or tort or in statutory law---entity law is consequently
more powerful and more successfully resists the application of enterprise
principles.
Unlike accepted versions of the older concept of entity law, the newer
enterprise doctrine is not an overriding concept applied transcendentally
throughout the entire legal spectrum. When courts and legislatures apply
enterprise principles, they do so only for the matter at hand. Entity law has
been superseded but only for that purpose.24 In numerous matters, entity
law continues to function as what may be described as the "default" doc-
trine. In those other areas, whether entity or enterprise law prevails de-
pends on which doctrine best implements the underlying objectives and
policies of the law in the particular area. In the complex jurisprudence
demanded by a complex society, both doctrines have roles to play.
In applying enterprise principles, the law disregards normal entity
principles in order to protect third parties affected by the corporate activity
or where statutes are involved in order to implement the statutory objective
and prevent it from being frustrated or readily evaded.
The familiar doctrine of "piercing the corporate veil" arose to serve
much the same objectives in "exceptional cases. '2 "Piercing" has served
the entity system as its "safety valve" to deal with the most blatant abuses
of corporate forms. However, "piercing the veil" has proven a failure.
Rigid in its formulation and yielding great uncertainty in any attempt to
24 For an example of courts making this exception, see Mesler v. Bragg Management Co., 702
P.2d 601, 607 (1985). For an example of legislatures making this exception, see Innkeepers' Teleman-
agement & Equipment Group, Inc., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16075, at *9 (N.D. 11. 1994) ("integrated
enterprise" standard in federal labor relations law does not apply to Illinois common-law tort law). See
generally BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS, supra note 1, § 14.01.
25 E.g., Perpetual Real Estate Servs., Inc. v. Michaelson Props., Inc., 974 F.2d 545 (4th Cir.
1992); Baker v. Raymond Int'l, Inc., 656 F.2d 173, 179 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 983
(1982).
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predict its outcome, "piercing" has led to hundreds, if not thousands, of
irreconcilable cases in each year.
Further, "piercing" jurisprudence in many jurisdictions has become
self-contradictory. Traditional "piercing" jurisprudence rests on a demon-
stration of three fundamental elements: the subsidiary's lack of independ-
ent existence; the fraudulent, inequitable, or wrongful use of the corporate
form; and a causal relationship to the plaintiff's loss. Unless each of these
three elements has been shown, courts have traditionally held "piercing"
unavailable.26
However, the traditional "three-factor" doctrine has presented so many
problems that some courts such as the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit 7 have abandoned it entirely and have adopted "single-factor pierc-
ing"" as governing law for "piercing" cases. Other courts have continued
to apply "three-factor piercing," but no longer rely on it exclusively. In a
separate line of decisions that do not cite the "three-factor piercing" deci-
sions in the jurisdictions, these courts have rejected the need to demon-
strate each of the elements of the traditional three-factor doctrine. Not-
withstanding the absence of proof of one of the factors traditionally re-
quired, these courts have approved "piercing" where proof of one of the
elements has been particularly striking. Thus, these courts have refused to
recognize corporations that have lacked any realistic independent exis-
tence. Where a corporation has had no business objective or in other ways
has been a "sham,"29 or where the corporation's exercise of "control" has
been so intrusive that the subsidiary has lacked significant decision-making
power of its own, as where the parent even made day-to-day decisions,
"piercing" has been approved without regard to the other elements tradi-
tionally required.3"
Similarly, where the corporation has been formed or used to accom-
plish a fraudulent, inequitable, or wrongful purpose, courts have intervened
to protect the victimized party or the government when a statute was being
evaded, however meticulously the wrongdoer has observed the forms of
26 See BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS, supra note 1, §§ 11.01 (general), 59.02, 60.02 (torts),
68.02, 69.01 (contracts).
27 E.g., Carte Blanche (Singapore) Pte., Ltd. v. Diners Club Int'l, Inc., 2 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 1993);
William Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers S., Inc., 933 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1991); see
BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS, supra note 1, § 26.02. Under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938), the Court only applies its single-factor doctrine in matters arising in federal question
jurisdiction matters and is obliged to apply state law, typically three-factor piercing, in cases arising in
diversity jurisdiction matters. See id. at 64-66.
28 See BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS, supra note 1, § § 12.01 (general), 26.01, 26.02 (juris-
diction), 59.02, 60.01, 60.02 (torts), 68.01, 69.01.
29 See id § 12.02 [B].
30 See generally id. §§ 12.02[D], 24.08 (noting the unanimity among American courts that pierc-
ing is justified "when the exercise of the parent corporation's or controlling shareholder's control goes
to the extreme of making day-to-day decisions for the subsidiary").
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independent existence. 31 Notwithstanding this erosion, "traditional three-
factor piercing" continues to dominate American law.
The law of corporate groups is not limited to business groups consist-
ing of parent and subsidiary corporations. Putting aside the matter of cor-
porate forms, the factors inherent in the intertwined relationships that char-
acterize enterprises collectively conducted by corporate affiliates are found
in numerous other familiar economic relationships involving dominant and
subservient interrelated parties.32 These other relationships also are charac-
terized by the very same factors of "control" (albeit resting on contract
rather than stock), collective conduct of an economically integrated enter-
prise, use of a common public persona, and financial and administrative
interdependence.
Of these comparable relationships, franchise systems are the leading
example. In the franchise area, franchisors and franchisees collectively
carry on a single integrated enterprise under the control of the franchisor
and under the franchisor's public persona and marketing plan.34 A surpris-
ingly large number of comparable other relationships exist. These include
health care organizations and medical staff;35 licensors and licensees;36
31 See id. § 12.03 (discussing situations in which courts have used single-factor piercing based on
circumstances including fraudulent incorporation to escape a preexisting obligation and misrepresenta-
tion about the identity of the entity).
32 See id. § 160.01-160.02 (introducing the idea of applying enterprise principles to economic
undertakings that resemble corporate groups but are not linked by stock ownership, such as franchisors
and franchisees, licensors and licensees, and health care institutions and medical staff).
33 See generally id. §§ 161.01-170.04 (detailing the franchise relationship, applicable statutory
regulation, jurisdictional issues, procedural problems, and liability concerns).
34In many respects, parent/subsidiary and franchisor/franchisee structures strongly resemble each
other, and they seem functionally interchangeable and indistinguishable to their guests. In one litiga-
tion considering whether a New York court had personal jurisdiction over Holiday Inn, Inc., it emerged
that the company conducted its operations in the state through six hotels operated by subsidiaries and
thirty-seven hotels operated by franchisees. See Vaughan v. Columbia Sussex Corp., No. 91 Civ. 1629
(CSH), 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 820, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). Similarly, the United Nations World In-
vestment Report contains a summary on the operations of hotel chains throughout the world in the form
of subsidiaries, franchises, and leases. This report shows the Hilton system operates seventeen hotels
through subsidiaries and fifty through franchises or leases. World Investment Report 2004, U.N. Con-
ference on Trade and Development, at 106, Box tbl. 111.2.1, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2004, U.N.
Sales No. E.04.1I.D.36 (2004), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2004_en.pdf.
Similarly, Hertz has utilized both subsidiaries and franchisees in its operations. Thus, plaintiffs
allegedly injured in an accident in England with a car leased from Hertz discovered that they had been
dealing not with Hertz but with an English third-tier subsidiary, while in another litigation involving an
accident at the Miami International Airport, the plaintiff discovered that he had been in fact dealing
with a Hertz franchisee based in the Virgin Islands. Compare Hertz Int'l, Ltd. v. Richardson, 317 So.
2d 824, 825-26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), with Dickson v. Hertz Corp., 559 F. Supp. 1169, 1171, 1176
(D.V.I. 1983).
35For a discussion of health care organizations, see BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS, supra
note 1, §§ 171.01, 172.01-.03,07,10-13, .16.
36 For a discussion of licensors and licensees, see id. §§ 173.02, .04, .06, .07.
2005)
CONNECTICUT LA W REVIEW
parties in integrated chains of contracts;" lender liability where lenders
have assumed roles in operating the businesses of defaulting borrowers;
38
and parties engaged in the "stream of commerce" (including manufactur-
ers, distributors, wholesalers, and retailers) in jurisdiction and tort law.39
Still additional examples are found in such familiar common-law doctrines
as respondeat superior," inherent agency,4 and successor liability.42 Ap-
pendix A at the end of this paper illustrates their fundamental jurispruden-
tial identity.
43
From a jurisprudential point of view, all these developments can be
seen as examples of relational law with legal rights and obligations resting
on status, not on contract." Years ago, Sir Henry Maine observed that the
history of English law was best understood as the movement from status to
contract.45 This is no longer true. In many commercial areas, the growing
acceptance of enterprise principles and the intragroup attribution of rights
and liabilities from one affiliate to another demonstrate that at least insofar
as commercial relationships are concerned, the law in many respects is
moving from contract back to status.
Adoption of enterprise principles has served as the response of the le-
gal system to the challenges presented by the inadequacy of traditional
legal doctrines to cope with the problems presented by the complexities of
the modem society. This is evident not only in corporation law but in
many other areas as well. It is a profound development in world jurispru-
dence.
3 7 Seeid. § 173.01.
38 For a discussion of lenders and defaulting borrowers, see id. §§ 174.01, .04, .07.
39 For a discussion of stream of commerce jurisprudence, see id §§ 30.09, -. 10.
40 For a discussion of respondeat superior, see id. §§ 177.01-.04.
41 For a discussion of inherent agency, see id. §§ 178.04, .07.
42 For a discussion of successor liability, see id §§ 179.05-.11.
43 See id. § 182.03.
44See ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 12-24 (1921); 1 ROSCOE POUND,
JURISPRUDENCE 210-21 (1959); cf IAN MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO
MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 72-108 (1980) (discussing the notion of relational contract law);
MacNeil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 483 (summarizing
how different legal areas have incorporated basic norms of relational thinking); Leon Green, Relational
Interests, 29 ILL. L. REv. 460 (1934) (analyzing relational interests and their protection, jurisprudential
operation, and value).
45HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF SO-
CIETY, AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 164-65 (2d ed. 1874).
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APPENDIX A. RELATIONAL LAW: ATTRIBUTION OF RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES BETWEEN RELATED ECONOMIC ACTORS IN THE
UNDERTAKING IN THE ABSENCE OF CONTRACT, ESTOPPEL OR
PARTICIPATION
Parent- Franchisor- Licensor-
Subsidiary Franchisee Licensee
Common Economic
Undertaking Yes Yes Yes
Link Equity Contract Contract
Dominant/
Subservient Yes Substantial Limited
Parties:
("Control")
Economic Yes Yes Yes
Integration
Administrative Substantial but Substantial but No
Interdependence Varying Varying
Financial Substantial but Varying No
Interdependence Varying
Employment Varying Limited but No
Integration Varying
Common Public
Persona: Company Varying Yes No
Common Public
Persona: Varying Yes Yes
Product
Aggrieved Parties
Without Effective No Varying No
Remedy
Aggrieved Parties
Chiefly Consumers No Yes No
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Integrated Health Care Joint Ventures,
Chains of Institutions & Networks &
Contractors Medical Staff Alliances
Common
Economic Yes Yes Partial
Undertaking
Link Contract Contract & Site Cross Equity or
Contract
Dominant/
Subservient No Limited No
Parties:
("Control")
Economic Yes Yes Yes
Integration
Administrative No N/A No
Interdependence
Financial No N/A No
Interdependence
Employment No Yes No
Integration
Common Public
Persona: No Varying No
Company
Common Public No Yes No
Persona:
Product
Aggrieved Parties
Without Effective No Varying No
Remedy
Aggrieved Parties
Chiefly Varying Yes Varying
Consumers
[Vol. 37:605
THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS
Inherent Lender Successor Product Respondeat
Agency Liability Liability Liability Superior
Common
Economic Yes Partial Yes (in Yes Yes
Undertaking Tandem)
Link Equity Debt Contract & Product Employment
Product
Dominant/
Subservient Yes Substantial N/A No Yes
Parties:
("Control")
Economic Yes Limited Yes (in Yes Yes
Integration Tandem)
Administrative Varying No No No No
Interdependence
Financial Varying Yes No No No
Interdependence
Employment N/A No Substantial No N/A
Integration
Common Public
Persona: No No Varying No No
Company
Common Public N/A No Yes Yes N/A
Persona:
Product
Aggrieved Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parties Without (Ineffective Varying (Unless (Ineffective (Ineffective
Effective Remedy) Remedy) Remedy) Remedy)
Remedy
Aggrieved
Parties No No Varying Yes Yes
Chiefly
Consumers
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